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Abstract
We reexamine the properties of optimal fiscal policy and their implications for
implementable capital accumulation. The setup is a standard endogenous
growth model with public production services, augmented by elastic labor
supply. We show that, when a benevolent government chooses a distorting
income tax rate to finance public production services by taking into account
the competitive decentralized equilibrium, public production services can no
longer play their traditional role as an engine of long-run endogenous growth.
This follows from a simple combination of Ramsey second-best fiscal policy
and endogenous labor/leisure choices.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
    It is known that w hen  taxes are  distortionary and government  spending is 
unproductive, government involvement is bad for capital accumulation.  By contrast, when 
government  spending is  productive,  policymakers face a well-defined tradeoff: public 
production services can be the engine of perpetual economic growth, but they have to be 
financed by distortionary taxes. Then, the challenge is to identify the optimal tax rate and the 
associated optimal level of government spending. Since Barro’s [1990] influential paper,
1 
this has become one of the most active research areas (see, among others, Jones, Manuelli 
and Rossi [1993], Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995], Glomm and Ravikumar [1994, 1997], 
Benhabib,  Rustichini a nd  Velasco [1996], Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell [1999]  and 
Turnovsky [2000a, b]).      
This paper extends this analysis by endogenizing labor/leisure choices. In all other 
respects, our model is a standard Barro-type model of endogenous growth and optimal 
fiscal policy. Namely, a model in which a benevolent government chooses a distorting 
income tax rate to finance public production services by taking into account the competitive 
decentralized equilibrium. That is, we solve for Ramsey second-best fiscal policy.
2 We show 
that endogenizing labor/leisure decisions changes the results drastically: public production 
services can no longer generate perpetual long-run growth. Therefore, the result that public 
production services are capable of generating long-term growth is not robust.   
We wish to emphasize that despite the influence and popularity of the Barro-type 
model of endogenous growth and optimal fiscal policy, there have been no versions of this 
model that combine second-best policy and elastic labor supply. Turnovsky [2000a] has 
studied optimal fiscal policy in a similar model with elastic labor supply, but he focuses on 
fiscal policies that can replicate the first-best outcome obtained by the central planner.  
                                                                 
1 Early models of capital accumulation, in which public capital is a factor of private production, also 
include Shell [1967] and Arrow and Kurz [1970]. Barro’s model is a variant of the AK model (see Rebelo 
[1991]) because it results in a linear production function. See e.g. Jones and Manuelli [1997] for a survey 
of different classes of endogenous growth models.  
2 By Ramsey second-best fiscal policy, we mean that the government’s objective is to find the optimal 
fiscal policy (in our case, the income tax rate and the associated level of public production services) that 
achieves maximal consumer utility and induces the competitive allocation of resources. See Lucas and 
Stokey [1983] and Lucas [1990]. Other well-known applications of the Ramsey approach to optimal fiscal 
policy include  Chamley [1986], Stiglitz [1987], Zhu [1992],  Jones, Manuelli and Rossi [1993], Chari, 
Christiano and Kehoe [1994], Judd [1999], etc.    2
  Our model has five distinct features.  First, it is a one-sector endogenous growth 
model with public production services. Second, the government uses distortionary income 
taxes to finance its expenditures.  Third, we include labor/leisure as a choice variable so that 
labor supply is endogenous. Fourth, the government is able to commit itself to future policies. 
Fifth, the optimal fiscal policy (i.e. income tax and public services) is chosen by a benevolent 
government subject to the decentralized competitive equilibrium. In other words, when the 
government chooses its optimal fiscal policy, it takes into account the optimal behavior of 
private agents (who have acted competitively by taking prices, tax policy and public services 
as given), the economy’s constraints, and market-clearing price determination. As we said 
above, this is a typical Ramsey second-best policy.      
Our main results are as follows. We first show that in a competitive decentralized 
equilibrium, for any feasible economic policy, the relation between long-run growth and the 
income tax rate is inverse U-shaped. That is, as in most models in this literature, the growth 
rate increases and then decreases with the distortionary tax rate. The critical tax rate, that 
ensures long-run growth, depends mainly on the productivity of public capital services and 
the rate of intertemporal substitution for labor.  
We then endogenize fiscal policy. Our results imply that, while the short-run growth 
rate can be positive,  the long-run  growth rate  is zero. That is, productive government 
spending, financed by optimally chosen distortionary taxes, can implement positive capital 
accumulation only in the short run. It cannot implement positive capital accumulation in the 
long run. Specifically, the Ramsey tax and spending policy cannot stimulate the rate of long-
run growth,  although  they can influence the levels of long-run output, consumption and 
employment. This resembles the neo-classical model. Therefore, the growth implications of 
Ramsey second-best fiscal policy are very different from the implications that have been 
drawn from similar studies that assume that labor supply is inelastically supplied. 
The intuition is as follows. When labor supply is elastic and endogenously chosen, 
any increase in output requires more labor input, as well as more private capital and public 
production  services (factors are complementary to each other). In this case, since leisure 
enters preferences, higher economic activity exerts ceteris paribus a negative effect on 
households’ welfare.  At the same time, in a decentralized setup, individual agents have not 
internalized the positive effects of public production services (this is basically a coordination   3
failure problem); this results in a wedge between the social and the private rate of capital 
return, and hence leads to inefficiently low economic growth. Under these circumstances, to 
get the right quantity of public services and so increase the growth rate, the government has 
to resort to higher income taxes.  In general equilibrium, and with Ramsey second-best 
taxation, the positive growth effect from government spending is counter-balanced by the 
negative growth effects from distorting taxes and the disutility from work effort. The two 
latter adverse effects exactly offset the former positive effect and, eventually, long-run 
growth is zero. 
By contrast, when fiscal policy is chosen by a social planner, or when labor is 
inelastically supplied, public production services can generate long-run growth.
3 Therefore, 
public production services are not capable of playing their traditional role as an engine of 
long-run growth, when two conditions are present: First, policymakers seek to guide the 
decentralized economy. Specifically, in our setup, Ramsey second-best policy is also chosen 
to close the wedge between social and private rates of return arising from decentralized 
private behavior. Second, labor/leisure is optimally chosen. This basically means that higher 
economic activity comes at the cost of less leisure.      
The rest of the paper is as follows.  Section II presents the economy. Section III 
characterizes the competitive decentralized equilibrium, for any fiscal policy. Section IV 
solves for Ramsey second-best policies and studies their implications. Section V discusses 
conclusions and extensions.  An Appendix contains technical details.     
 
II. THE ECONOMY 
 
  This section sets up a closed economy with a private sector and a government 
sector.  We will keep the model as simple as possible so as to make our results directly 
comparable to those of the literature.  The private sector consists of a representative 
household and a representative firm, who both act competitively.  The household consumes, 
supplies labor elastically and rents out its assets to the firm.  The firm produces output by 
choosing private inputs (capital and labor) and taking advantage of public production   4
services.  The government taxes the firm’s output to finance public production services.
4 
There is no uncertainty, time-horizons are infinite and time is continuous. Economic agents 
are endowed with perfect foresight.  
  This section will solve for a decentralized competitive equilibrium, given economic 
policy.   
 
The Problem of the Representative Household 
The household maximizes intertemporal utility:   
(1)    dt e L c u
t r -
¥
￿ ) , (
0
, 
where c is private consumption, L is labor services and the parameter  r > 0 is the rate of 
time preference.  The instantaneous utility function  ) , ( L c u  is increasing in c and decreasing 
in  L; is twice continuously differentiable and concave in  ) , ( L c ; and satisfies a constant 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the Inada conditions.  For simplicity, we assume 
that  ) , ( L c u  is additively separable in c and L, and takes the functional form:
5      
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where,  1 ‡ e .  That is, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for c is 1 and that for labor 
is 
1 - e .  
  The household saves in the form of assets, denoted by a, so that it receives interest 
income ra , where r  is the market asset return.  The household also supplies elastically its 
labor services L, so that wage income is wL, where w is the market wage rate.  It also 
receives net dividends d  from ownership of firms.  Thus, the household’s budget constraint 
is:   
                                                                                                                                                                                          
3 Our results are therefore consistent with Turnovsky [2000a], who gets long-run growth under “first-
best” policy making. They are also consistent with Park and Philippopoulos [2000], who get long-run 
growth under fixed labor supply.   
4 Our qualitative results do not change if we use income taxes on households or capital taxes on firms.  
This is because the model is a variant of the AK-model at aggregate level (see below). In general, output 
taxes are less distortionary than capital taxes and thus satisfy the production efficiency principle: taxes 
should be levied on the final good, not intermediate inputs.     
5 This instantaneous utility function is commonly used in a growing economy.  As in Benhabib and 
Farmer [1994], Benhabib and Perli [1994], Guo and Lansing [1999] and Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini [1998], 
with a Cobb-Douglas technology, a logarithmic utility function of consumption is the only formulation 
of preferences that is consistent with constant labor supply in a growing economy.     5
(3)    d wL ra a c + + = +
•
, 
where a dot over a variable denotes time derivative and the initial stock of assets,  0 a , is 
given.   
  The household  acts competitively by taking prices  as given.  The necessary 
conditions are equation (3) above, as well as the familiar conditions:    
(4)     ] [ r - =
•
r c c ; 
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The necessary conditions (3), (4), and (5) are completed with the addition of the 













r .  A unique solution exists given the assumed utility 
function.   
 
The Problem of the Representative Firm 
Firms choose private capital  k  and labor  L , but they take public production 
services  g  as given.  T he  production function is  increasing and twice continuously 
differentiable in  ) , , ( g L k .
6   It also  satisfies  the  Inada condition for  ) , , ( g L k .  Public 
production services  g  are assumed to be non-exclusive and thereby the aggregate 
production  function exhibits overall increasing returns to scale in  the  three factors.  
Specifically, the firm’s production function is:   
(6)   
b a a L k Ag y
- =
1 , 
where  0 > A ,  1 , 0 < < b a  and  1 £ +b a  (the  condition  1 £ +b a  is  needed f or 
existence of a solution to the firm’s problem).  Following Rebelo [1991], this formulation 
permits persistent capital accumulation in the long run. 
                                                                 
6 Following Barro [1990], Benhabib et al. [1996], Turnovsky [2000a] and many others, we assume that it is 
the flow of public services that provides production externalities rather than the stock of public capital. 
On the other hand, Futagami et al. [1993], Glomm and Ravikumar [1994] and Turnovsky [2000b] use the 
stock of public capital, while Baxter and King [1993] and Lansing [1999] do the same in calibrated RBC 
models.  It would be interesting to see whether our main results change if we use stocks.     6
The government taxes the firm’s output at a rate  1 0 < <t  in each time period.  The 
representative firm acts competitively by taking prices, policy instruments and public services 
as given.  It maximizes profits p  given by:  
(7)    wL rk y - - - = ) 1 ( t p . 
The familiar first-order conditions for k  and L are respectively:  
(8)   
b a a t a L k Ag r
1 1 ) 1 (
- - - = ; 
(9)   
1 1 ) 1 (
- - - =
b a a t b L k Ag w . 
 
The Government’s Budget Constraint 
We assume, for simplicity, that the government balances its budget at each point of 
time.  Then, by using (6), the government’s budget constraint is:   
(10)    y g t = a
b
a at kL A
1 1
= .  
 
III. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATIONS 
 
We will now characterize the Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE), for any 
feasible fiscal policy. With endogenous government spending, fiscal policy can be fully 
summarized by the path of income tax rates, t .    
Using (10) into (6), the economy-wide output in a DCE is:   









so that, at aggregate level, output is linear in private capital. Hence, this is a variant of the 
AK-model augmented with endogenous labor supply.
7 
  Using (10) into (8), the return to capital in a DCE is:  
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This is the return that drives private consumption/saving decisions in a DCE. This return 








. Notice that 
R r < . That is, as is typically the case in models with production externalities, when private 
                                                                 
7 If we use capital taxes, the linear AK technology is preserved even with endogenous labor supply.      7
agents do not internalize the externalities offered by public production  services, the 
decentralized rate of capital return, and hence the rate of economic growth, are inefficiently 
low.  
Working similarly, (9) and (10) give the wage rate in a DCE:  










a t t b kL A w . 
Thus, the firm’s realized profit is in a DCE:   
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Then, using (12), (13) and (14), as well as  k a =  and  p = d , into (3), (4) and (5), 
the system of dynamic equations for  L c k , ,  in a DCE is:  
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8   
Therefore, we have solved for a Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE), for 
any feasible economic policy as summarized by the income tax rate, t . In this equilibrium: 
(a) private decisions are optimal; (b) all constraints are satisfied; (c) all markets clear; (d) the 








- D L ) (  is satisfied.
9  This DCE is summarized by 
equations (15a), (15b) and (15c).  
                                                                 
8  It is important for the properties of Ramsey policy in the next section to note that due to externalities 
(i.e.  1 0 < <a ), we have the realized, or social, return to capital,  ) (
1 t a D =
- R , in the resource constraint 
(15a), but the perceived, or private, return to capital,  ) (t D = r , in the Euler equation (15b).  In other 
words, there is a wedge between the rate of capital return that determines the stream of income in (15a) 
and the rate of capital return that drives consumption/saving decisions in (15b). Of course, without 
externalities,  r  and R  coincide.   
9 Boundedness of lifetime utility also satisfies the transversality condition.    8
 
Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium in the long run  
It will be useful for what follows in the next section, to study the properties of the 
DCE in the long run. Since public production services are expected to generate long-term 
growth, we focus on Balanced Growth Path (BGP) solutions. That is, solutions on which: (a) 
consumption and capital can grow at the same rate; (b) labor supply is constant.  Then, the 
conditions for non-negative long-run growth can be summarized as follows: 
 
Proposition 1:  In a Decentralized Competitive  Economy g iven the tax rate t , 
consumption and capital can grow without a finite limit in the long run, and thereby 
the long-run growth rate is non-negative, provided that the exogenous tax rate t  
satisfies:  
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a t t a t A .  For the u pper bound,  ) (t D has  a 
maximum at  = t   a - 1 . For the lower bound of  ) (t D , we combine (15a) and (15c) so that 
we have  [ ]
) 1 ( 1
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L  ensures non-negative 














L  is required for strictly positive growth.  
Therefore, when the exogenous tax rate satisfies 






> D , the economy can grow 
at a strictly positive rate in the long run; when 






= D , the economy ceases to 
grow in the long run.                                                               ￿      
   
Note that equations (15a)-(15c) and Proposition 1 above imply that there is a non-
monotonic, inverse U -shaped, relation between the income tax rate and the growth rate, 
where the  maximum  is  at  a t - =1 .  This is a well-known result in this literature: for 
relatively low tax rates, the growth rare increases with the tax rate, but for relatively high tax   9
rates, the growth rate decreases with the tax rate.
10  Also, note that the critical tax rate, that 
ensures long-run growth, depends mainly on the productivity of public capital services and 
the rate of intertemporal substitution for labor.
11 
We are now ready to  endogenize  economic policy,  t . By choosing  t , the 
government will attempt to internalize the existing externalities and also collect tax revenues 
to finance the optimal provision of public services.    
 
IV.  OPTIMAL (RAMSEY) ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
  We assume that the g overnment chooses income taxes,  t , by acting as a 
benevolent planner that plays Stackelberg  vis-a-vis the private sector. In particular, the 
government takes into account the DCE summarized by equations (15a), (15b) and (15c).  
This means that the government will also take into account the private agents’ response to its 
tax policy. We assume c ommitment technologies on behalf of the government, so that 
decisions are made once-and-for-all and become an open-loop equilibrium. All this means 
that the government will find the optimal implementable competitive decentralized allocation 
that maximizes the utility of the representative consumer.  Thus, this is a Ramsey second-
best policy problem.     
Formally, the government chooses the path of t  to maximize (1)-(2) subject to 
(15a), (15b) and  (15c).  The current-value Hamiltonian,  ) , , , , , ( k c L k c H l l t , of this 
problem is:    
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where  c l  and  k l  are dynamic multipliers associated respectively with (15a) and (15b).    
The necessary conditions with respect to  k c L c, , , , l t  and  k l  are given by (18a), 
(18b), (18c), (18d), (18e), (18f) respectively, and the transversality condition in (18g):
12    
                                                                 
10  See e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, chapter 4]. 
11 This follows from the property of Q  and the continuity of  ) (t D  in  ) 1 , 0 ( ˛ t .  In particular, the lower 
bound of  ) (t D  is increasing in Q  as the elasticity 
e
1
 increases.                 
12 The government directly chooses quantity allocations (i.e. consumption, labor and capital), as well as 
economic policy instruments. This is as in e.g. Lucas and Stokey [1983], Chamley [1986], etc.  An   10
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13  
 
Since the utility function and the constraints are continuous and bounded, and the 
utility function is strictly concave in the controls  ) , ( L c  and the constraints are linear in c and 
k  and strictly concave in  L and t , a Ramsey fiscal policy and an implementable optimal 
resource allocation exists.  Further, since  ” ) , , , , ( k c L k c H l l   ) , , , , , ( max k c L k c H l l t
t  is 
concave in  k c,  and L for given  ) , ( k c l l , the necessary conditions, (18a)-(18g), are also 
sufficient for optimality.
14  Therefore, collecting arguments, we have:  
 
Proposition 2:  Under the assumptions on the utility and production functions, there 
exists a Ramsey income taxation and an associated level of public production services, 
which implement a decentralized competitive allocation.  
 
Observe that equations (18a)-(18f) constitute a system of six  equations in 
k c L k c l l t , , , , , .  Following usual practice, we will reduce the dimensionality of this system 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
alternative way of formulating the Ramsey policy problem  would be to assume that the government 
chooses economic policy instruments only to maximize the consumer’s indirect utility function.  
13 This condition guarantees that lifetime utility is bounded.  
14 This is based on Arrow’s sufficiency theorem in the optimal control theory.        11
to facilitate analytical tractability.  Define the consumption-to-capital ratio as z
c
k
”  and the 
auxiliary variable  c cl g ” . Then, by taking logarithms on both sides of (18a), differentiating 
with respect to time, and using (18b), (18c), (18d), (18e) and (18f), we get after some 
algebra:
15    
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L .  
  Therefore, the original six-dimensional system (18a)-(18f) in  k c L k c l l t , , , , ,  has 
been reduced to the three-dimensional system (19a)-(19c) in  g t, , z .  The dynamics of the 
latter are equivalent to those of the former.  The next subsection will study the properties of 
(19a)-(19c) in the steady state. 
 
Steady State   
This subsection analyzes the steady state of the Ramsey problem.  A Balanced 




” , is constant. Thus,  0
•
” z  in (19a).  This means that c 
and k can grow at a common constant rate.  (b) The tax rate, t , is constant. Thus,  0 ”
•
t  
in (19c).  (c) The auxiliary variable g  is constant.  Thus,  0 ”
•
g  in (19b).
16   
  Then, we have: 
 
                                                                 
15 Details are available upon request.  
16 This steady state definition is consistent with the analysis of the DCE in the long run at the end of 
previous section.    12
Proposition 3:  Given Proposition 2: (a) W ith endogenous labor supply, public 
production services cannot generate long-run endogenous growth as in the standard 
Barro-type model. That is, with endogenous labor supply and Ramsey second-best 
fiscal policy, the economy cannot lie on its strictly positive balanced growth path.  (b) 
The zero long-run growth rate is supported by multiple (two) second-best output tax 
rates.    
 
Proof:  Let us denote the steady state values of  ) , , ( g t z  by  ) ~ , ~ , ~ ( g t z .  To solve for 
) ~ , ~ , ~ ( g t z , we start with (19a).  Setting  0 ”
•
z , (19a) implies that the long-run consumption-
to-capital ratio is:  
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1 ~ D œ ß
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which is always positive since  ) ~ (t D  is positive.   
We continue with (19b). Setting  0 ”
•
g , we simply get:   
(21)   
r
g
1 ~ = . 
Finally, consider (19c).  Setting  0 ”
•
t  and using (20) and (21), we get:   
(22)    e b + = 1
1 ~ L , 
Combining (20)-(22), it follows that 
a
r
= z ~  and 






= D . Then, from 






 in the steady state.    
Finally, since  a
a




~ ) ~ 1 ( ) ~ ( A  is an  inverse U -shaped function, there are 
two values of t ~satisfying 







17                                                            ￿ 
  
                                                                 
17 In this class of models,  the optimal  long-run capital  tax rate is positive  even in equilibria with 
commitment. This is simply because government spending is productive. When government spending 
is not productive, the optimal long-run tax rare on capital is zero (see e.g. Chamley [1986] and Judd 
[1985]).    13
Interestingly, unlike the case with exogenous policy (see Proposition 1 above), this 
result does not depend on the size of elasticity 
e
1
 of intertemproal substitution.  That is, as 
long as labor supply is endogenously determined, the Ramsey second-best fiscal policies 
lead to zero long-run growth regardless of the degree of intertemporal substitution for labor.  
However, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for labor does affect the levels of output, 
consumption and labor (see e.g. equation (22)).  These properties resemble those of a neo-
classical growth model.   
As we have explained in some detail in the Introduction, the intuition is clear. When 
labor supply is elastic and endogenously chosen, any increase in output requires more labor 
input, as well as more private capital and public production services. In this case, since 
leisure enters preferences, higher economic activity exerts ceteris paribus a negative effect 
on households’ welfare. At the same time, in a decentralized setup, private agents have not 
internalized the positive externalities of public production services, and hence there is a 
wedge between the social and the private rate of capital return. To get the right quantity of 
public services, and hence increase the growth rate, the government has to resort to higher 
income taxes.  In general equilibrium, the positive growth effect from government spending is 
fully offset by the negative growth effects from distorting taxes and the disutility from work 
effort.  
To understand our result further, we also study the “social planner’s” problem. This 
is defined to be the benchmark case in which a social planner chooses fiscal policy (i.e. the 
income tax rate and the associated level of public services) subject to the economy’s 
constraints only. Thus, the crucial difference from the case above is that now optimizing 
policymakers do not face a wedge between social and private rates of return arising from 
decentralized private behavior [compare (15a) and (15b) in a DCE above]. Then, the 
following lemma shows that the growth rate can be strictly positive (under certain parameter 
values) even if labor supply is endogenously chosen. Thus, we have:   
 
Lemma  1:  Consider the case in which distortionary taxes are chosen by a social 
planner. Then,  (a) P ublic production services can generate long-run endogenous 
growth even with endogenous labor supply. This happens when the parameter values   14
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+ - A . (b) There is a unique long-run 
income tax rate, which is as in the standard Barro-type model, i.e.  a t - =1 . 
 
Proof: See Appendix.                                                                                                 ￿
   
Therefore, in the social planner’s case, the tax rate can be designed in such a way 
that the distortions from savings and labor supply are completely eradicated. Also, in this 
case, maximizing  growth rate is equivalent to welfare maximization. Moreover, unlike the 
second-best case, the social planner’s tax rate is unique and constant over time; thus, there 
are no transitional dynamics. Therefore, this benchmark case recovers the properties of the 
basic Barro-type AK model. Note that Turnovsky [2000b] gets similar results, when he 
shows that “ first-best” policy can  yield positive long-run  growth even if labor/leisure 
decisions are endogenously chosen.   
Therefore, the assumption of Ramsey second-best fiscal policy is crucial to our 
result. Obviously, the assumption of elastic labor supply is equally crucial. For instance, Park 
and Philippopoulos [2000] have shown that under Ramsey second-best fiscal policy as in 
the present paper, public production services are capable of generating long run growth if 
labor is inelastically supplied.
 As was explained above, this is because inelastic labor supply 
does not introduce additional adverse welfare effects and can hence permit public services 
to play their growth-enhancing role.  
 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS  
 
This paper has presented a standard endogenous growth model to reexamine the 
role of Ramsey (second-best) fiscal policy in the growth process.  Fiscal policy took the 
form of public production services financed by output taxes.  We showed that the long-run 
growth rate is zero once the labor supply becomes elastic. The result that public production 
services cannot play their traditional role as an engine of endogenous growth is somewhat 
surprising. Nevertheless, it happens when: (a) there is a wedge between social and private   15
rates of return arising from decentralized private behavior; (b) higher economic activity can 
come only at the cost of less leisure.  
Note that our result is consistent with the general consensus in the growth literature. 
Namely, it is widely accepted that many things may fundamentally change when labor supply 
becomes endogenous and leisure enters preferences (see e.g. Jones and Manuelli [1997], 
de Hek [1998] and Turnovsky [2000a, b] who explicitly recognize the importance of labor 
supply endogeneity).
18      
We close the paper with three possible extensions.  First, we could use the stock of 
public capital instead of the flow of public productive services. Second, it is interesting to 
consider the case in which the quality of labor/leisure can be improved.
19  Our feeling is that 
in this case the i mplementable growth rate could become positive. Third, we could add 
human capital, as in Lucas [1988], so that labor/leisure decisions are also affected by human 
capital accumulation.   
 
                                                                 
18 Also, Benhabib and Perli [1994], Benhabib and Farmer [1994], Ladron-de-Guevara et al. [1999] and 
Ortigueira [2000] have shown indeterminacy in endogenous growth models with elastic labor supply.  
Cazzavillan [1996], Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [1997] and  de Hek [1998]  have studied stability of a 
competitive equilibrium  in models with government  spending and leisure choices. In a neoclassical 
growth model, Lansing [1999] has examined the relation between Ramsey (second-best) redistributive 
taxation and long-run growth.  
19 Milesi-Ferretti  and Roubini  [1998]  have  considered optimal taxation with various leisure activities 




Proof of Lemma 1:  To solve the social planner’s problem, we assume that the government 
chooses  g L k c , , ,  and  t  to maximize (1)-(2)  subject to:  (a) the economy’s  resource 
constraint,  g c y k - - =
•
, where 
b a a L k Ag y
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1 ; (b) its own budget constraint,  y g t = . 










c c ,  c y k - - =
•















c c .   
By manipulation of the above equations, it follows that the efficient output tax rate is 
a t - =1  over time.  Also, we can easily get a condition which is sufficient for endogenous 
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A .   This long-run growth rate is unique.                                                                                                                      
￿      17
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